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Abstract 
Adopting a survey approach, our study examines how firms implement impairment test of goodwill. 
We focus on how firms define and measure the recoverable amount of CGU.  The survey includes 
58 completed questionnaires representing 73% of the firms on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange that 
recognise goodwill in the balance sheet. Our survey generally supports that a common practice on 
impairment tests of goodwill has not yet been established. Based on our analysis it is difficult to 
determine whether this simply reflects that firms adopt an approach suited to their organisational 
and economic structures or if it exposes that firms are uncertain as how to apply a standard. The 
analysis also reveals that some of the methods used when defining a CGU are not in compliance 
with IAS 36. In addition, we find inconsistencies in the way that firms estimate the recoverable 
amount. Our analysis should be of interest to a number of parties including firms, financial advisors, 
auditors, standard setters and users of financial statements. 
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How do firms implement impairment tests of goodwill?  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In March 2004 the revised IAS 36 was approved by IASB. According to the revised IAS 36 firms 
must carry out impairment test of goodwill on at least a yearly basis. If the recoverable amount of 
goodwill is less than its carrying amount, the carrying amount shall be reduced to its recoverable 
amount (e.g., an impairment loss is recognised). IAS 36 defines the recoverable amount as the 
higher of an asset’s value in use and fair value less costs to sell. This is a radical change in 
accounting for goodwill. Previously, international accounting standards required recognition of 
goodwill subject to amortisation over its useful life time.  
 
We conduct a descriptive study that examines how Danish companies implement the revised IAS 
36. We also evaluate what firms do in cases where IAS 361 provides little or no specific guidance. 
We focus on two issues in IAS 36 that have received attention in the literature: a) how firms define 
a cash generating unit (CGU) and b) how those firms measure the recoverable amount of a CGU. 
We focus on technical aspects related to carrying out impairment tests of goodwill. For instance, we 
examine how firms calculate cost of capital and how terminal value is estimated in calculating the 
recoverable amount. However, we do not address if estimates seem fair2. 
 
An empirical examination of how firms implement impairment test of goodwill seems warranted. 
First, while prior research (see e.g. Henning et al 2000; Jennings et al 2001; Bugeja and Gallery, 
2006) examine the information content of goodwill and goodwill amortisation (the correlation 
between accounting numbers for goodwill and market data ([stock prices and stock returns]), we 
examine how firms implement impairment test of goodwill. Anderson (2004) argues that the new 
and revised standards on business combinations and intangible assets respectively, have been well 
documented but there has been little discussion on how these requirements will be followed in 
practice. 
 
Second, IAS 36 is a standard that involves a great deal of judgement. An example is the 
identification of an asset’s cash generating unit (IAS 36, 68). Further, while value in use is one of 
                                                 
1 In cases where no recommendations are provided in IAS 36 we include recommendations from related literature. 
2 An analysis of the estimates that are the foundation for the impairment test is at least as important. For demarcation 
reasons we have chosen to focus on the technical aspects of IAS 36. 
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the measurement concepts in IAS 36, the standard is silent as to how various value drivers should 
be estimated. For example, IAS 36 does not provide a guidance that explains how terminal value 
should be measured. In addition, IAS 36 deviates from ‘traditional’ valuation practice on certain 
issues. A prime example is IAS 36, 55 that requires discount rates to be pre-tax rates.3 In fact, this 
policy is questioned by whose who responded to the exposure draft on IAS 36, who raise concerns 
in regard to using pre-tax discount rates (IAS 36, BC91). Petersen et al. (2006) provide evidence 
that discount rates in practice are estimated on an after-tax basis. This approach is also supported by 
a number of popular valuation text books such as Koller et al (2005) and Damodaran (2002). 
 
Finally, IAS 36 is a complicated standard that requires special knowledge about valuation 
techniques. Producers of accounting information (firms) and their financial advisers must possess 
the necessary technical skills (e.g. be able to apply valuation models) and economic expertise (e.g. 
make fair budget assumptions) that is needed to carry out impairment tests. These skills are needed, 
as auditors may not assist in such valuation work under strict ethical and independence rules 
(Anderson, 2004).  
 
Many argue that an impairment test only approach seems a logical step in the development of 
accounting for goodwill. First, the underlying logic for removing the traditional amortisation 
methodology is that the amortisation on a straight-line basis over a number of years contains no 
information value for those using financial statement (Ravlic, 2003). Moreover, IFRS 3 no longer 
requires that companies perform the almost impossible task of estimating the useful life for 
goodwill (Jansson et al., 2004). Second, the impairment approach should provide users of financial 
statements with better information, as goodwill is not automatically amortised (Colquitt and 
Wilson, 2002). Finally, goodwill impairment tests would be operational and capture a decline in 
value of goodwill (Donnelly and Keys, 2002).  
 
On the other hand, the new approach in accounting for goodwill may be questioned on several 
grounds. First, while amortisation of goodwill is considered to be arbitrary, it is easy to apply in 
comparison with the impairment approach. The major benefit of amortisation of goodwill on a 
straight line basis is that it is possible with a greater accuracy to predict the impacts of earnings. 
(Stevenson and McPhee, 2005). This is in line with Lachnit and Müller (2003) who argue that to 
                                                 
3 IAS 36, BC94 acknowledges that discounting post-tax cash flows at a post-tax discount rate and discounting pre-tax 
cash flows at a pre-tax discount rate should give the same result. 
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achieve comparability among firms, adjustments for different accounting practices are necessary. 
Among the different kinds of treatment of goodwill, they regard the amortisation of goodwill over a 
predetermined time horizon as the most useful practice. Only by amortizing goodwill on a 
systematic basis is it possible to determine “normalized” or “permanent” income as a measure of 
earnings power. Second, conducting a detailed test for impairment on every asset and associated 
goodwill from initial acquisition at the end of each reporting period may be time consuming and 
costly (Mcgeachin, 1997; Rockness, Rockness and Ivancewich, 2001). Third, the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) in their comments to IFRS 3 expresses "major 
concerns" over IFRS 3. EFRAG argue that the standard would introduce unreliable measurements 
of the recoverable amount of goodwill. 
 
In light of the above, we find it relevant to examine how Danish firms implement impairment tests 
of goodwill. To do so we send out questionnaires to every Danish listed company that reports 
goodwill.4 Thereby, we obtained a unique dataset that provides in dept information concerning how 
impairment test of goodwill is carried out in practice. Our results indicate that a common practice 
has not yet been established. Further, some firms do not define a CGU in compliance with IAS 36. 
Finally, we find inconsistencies in the way that firms estimate the recoverable amount. Areas of 
concern include calculating the before-tax discount rate, adjusting for risk, and estimating the cash 
flow in the terminal period. 
 
Since international accounting standards have been adopted by listed firms in several countries our 
results should be of interest for a large number of firms, auditors, standard setters and users of 
financial statements. For example, Australia and New Zealand adopted the international accounting 
standards on 1 January 2005 and 1 July 2007, respectively, and listed firms in both countries have 
to comply with the same accounting standards as the listed Danish firms.5 Among other things, we 
believe that our results will serve as a guidance to improve current practice - especially in areas 
where firms seem to have difficulties in carrying out impairment test properly. 
 
Our paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of how goodwill is accounted 
for. A description of the methodology, sample, and descriptive statistics follow in sections 3 and 4. 
                                                 
4 Software to our internet based questionnaire has been provided by Enalyzer. 
5 Please refer to Banghøj and Plenborg (2007) for a comparison of the Australian, New Zealand and Danish accounting 
regulations and corporate governance systems. 
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Section 5 presents the results of how firms determine a CGU, while section 6 presents the empirical 
findings of how firms apply valuation techniques used for impairment testing purposes. Finally, 
section 7 presents conclusions and perspectives for further research.  
 
II. Accounting for goodwill under IFRS 3 and IAS 36  
 
IFRS 3, 36 requests that acquired assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities are recognised at fair 
value in the annual accounts of the acquiring firm, if they comply with recognition criteria, 
regardless of whether they have been recognised previously. IFRS 3 requires that to the extent the 
purchase price exceeds the total fair value of the identifiable net assets this difference is recognised 
as goodwill. IFRS 3 does not permit amortisation of goodwill but requires goodwill to be tested for 
impairment as set forth in IAS 36. 
 
IAS 36 demands that each separate asset is tested for impairment, if there are indications of 
impairment. Assets with an indeterminable lifetime, which are not amortised, must be tested for 
impairment at least on a yearly basis. Goodwill cannot be tested separately, as it represents 
resources that cannot be identified or quantified reliable. Goodwill is therefore allocated to the 
individual CGU or group of CGUs that benefit from the acquired goodwill (IAS 36, 80). If the 
recoverable amount of the CGU that goodwill is allocated to is lower than the carrying value of that 
unit the difference is expensed. If this difference is greater than the carrying amount of goodwill, 
the total goodwill amount is written off, while the remaining difference is allocated to (subtracted 
from) the remaining assets on a pro rata basis (IAS 36).6
 
The recoverable amount for an asset, CGU or group of CGUs is the higher of that its fair value less 
costs to sell and its value in use. Applying value in use of a CGU is problematic. Discounted cash 
flow calculations have previously been applied to financial assets and liabilities, where the expected 
future cash flows to a much larger extend is a good proxy for the future realized cash flows than 
will be the case for discounted cash flow calculations used to test for impairment. 
 
 
III. Research design 
 
                                                 
6 Apart from cash and cash equivalents etc. 
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We adopt a survey-based analysis to examine how Danish firms define a CGU and estimate the 
recoverable amount in carrying out impairment tests of goodwill. Given the descriptive nature of 
our study, surveys seem superior to other research methods [Yin (1994)]. Surveys complement 
other research methods based on either large samples or case studies. As pointed out by Graham 
and Harvey (2001), large studies are the most common type of empirical analysis offering statistical 
power and cross sectional variation. On the other hand, large sample studies have the weakness 
related to variable specification and the inability to ask qualitative questions. Case studies offer 
details and unique information regarding corporate behaviour, however such samples are small and 
results are often sample-specific. Surveys as adopted in this study offer a balance between large 
studies and case studies. We obtain a larger sample than in case studies, improving the validity. 
Further, we are able to ask detailed questions, which improve the quality of the data. Surveys 
(questionnaires) are not without potential problems, however. Surveys face the risk that the 
respondents are not representative of the population and that the questions are misunderstood. Each 
of these issues is addressed below. 
 
Based on a careful review of IAS 36 and related literature, we developed a draft questionnaire that 
focuses on a) identifying a CGU and b) measuring the recoverable amount of a CGU. The draft 
questionnaire was circulated to auditors from leading auditing firms and CFOs employed at large 
Danish firms. We incorporated their suggestions in the revised questionnaire. Further, we sought 
advice from colleagues that have specialised in surveys and received valuable feedback on design 
issues and ideas as how to increase the response rate. As a final test the questionnaire was mailed to 
four firms, which resulted in additional modifications of the questionnaire. 
 
 
IV. Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
To identify firms that carry goodwill in the balance sheet, we collected data form Account Data, a 
database that record accounting data from Danish listed firms. 80 out of a 165 firms that were listed 
on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange as of March 1, 2006 recognised goodwill as assets.7
 
                                                 
7 Account Data listed 82 firms recognising goodwill as of March 1, 2006. However, at the time we contacted those 
firms two of them no longer recognised goodwill. 
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Each of those 80 firms was contacted by phone in order to identify the person in charge of 
impairment testing.8 Personal contacts served two purposes. First, we wanted to make sure that the 
questionnaire was mailed to the right person (i.e., the one deeply involved in impairment testing). 
Second, the personal contacts would enable us to make follow up phone contacts either to remind 
respondents to fill in the questionnaire or for clarification purposes. Four of the 80 firms did not 
wish to participate in the survey. An internet based questionnaire was submitted to the remaining 76 
firms. The link was forwarded directly to the person in charge of impairment tests. The respondents 
also received a letter describing the purpose of the survey. After approximately three (six) weeks, a 
reminder was e-mailed to the persons that had not yet filled in the questionnaire. Finally, after 
another couple of weeks, we called the firms that had still not completed the questionnaire and 
encouraged them to do so. 
 
58 firms responded to every single question in the questionnaire. An additional four firms submitted 
usable feedback that were sufficient, although a few questions were left unanswered, leaving a final 
sample of 62 observations. Launsø and Rieper (2000) argue that feedback from at least 70% is 
sufficient to provide a picture of the population. Our questionnaire was filled in by 72.5%, while 
additionally 5 % of the respondents provided feedback on the major part of the questionnaire.9 A 
feedback rate of over 70% is quite unusual for questionnaires.   
 
In order to check the validity of the data (filled in questionnaire) we received, we contacted the 
respondents, who had permitted us to do so, and asked them to elaborate on their data and provide 
any further information they might have. This additional check didn’t change the general results as 
reported in the following sections.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
More than two-thirds of the firms have a turnover of DKK 0 – 5 billion and total assets amounting 
to DKK 0 – 10 billion. The largest firms have a turnover in excess of DKK 45 billion and assets of 
more than DKK 90 billion. Goodwill is a significant item ranging from DKK 1 million to DKK 
28.5 billion. On average, goodwill amounts to 6% of total assets. In one case, goodwill total 
approximately one-third of assets.  
                                                 
8 In almost all cases the CFO was the contact person. 
9 As 78% of all listed firms that recognise goodwill are part of our study, we believe that representativeness is not an 
issue (selection bias). 
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 On average (median) firms report DKK 1.280 (88) million in goodwill. This indicates that a few 
firms recognise considerable goodwill amounts. 
 
 Table 1: Firm characteristics Answers 
Turnover (billion DKK) 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 >45   
  69% 15% 6% 3% 2% 0% 2% 2% 0% 2% 62 
Assets (billion DKK) 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 >90   
  76% 8% 0% 2% 8% 0% 2% 0% 0% 5% 62 
Goodwill (billion DKK) 0-0,2 0,2-0,4 0,4-0,6 0,6-0,8 0,8-1,0 1,0-1,2 1,2-1,4 1,4-1,6 1,6-1,8 >1,8   
  74% 6% 3% 3% 3% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 62 
No. of subsidiaries 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 >91   
  42% 16% 10% 3% 6% 3% 6% 3% 2% 8% 62 
 
Most firms make on average 0-4 firm acquisitions per year (not reported).10  
 
Table 2 panel A uncovers that impairment tests typically is carried out by one or more persons from 
headquarter. This is the case in 47 of the firms. For 14 firms impairment tests is carried out in a 
teamwork involving the centralized and decentralized level. None of the participating firms carry 
out impairment tests exclusively on a decentralized level. This indicates that utilizing an impairment 
test is a complicated exercise requiring special know how. These competences are often found at the 
centralized level (headquarter) only. Table 2 panels B and C illustrate that it is mostly persons 
within the firm that carry out impairment tests, while12 firms receive external assistance by an 
auditing firm. In 52 (20+19+13) of the participating firms, the persons who are involved in 
impairment tests are partly or often engaged in other valuation tasks (Table 2 panel D). In six (5+1) 
firms the person(s), who is involved in impairment tests, is not active in other valuation tasks. As 
there is a considerable overlap in the competences that are required to carry out impairment tests 
and other valuation tasks (typically acquisitions of firms), it would seem more appropriate to 
involve the same resource person(s). Often the methods used for valuation will be similar and 
assumable there will also be a considerable overlap in budgeting. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Not all results are reported for reasons of space. 
 9
Table 2  
Panel A 
How are impairment tests carried out? 
No. # 
By a central or central placed person 47 
In a cooperation between decentralized and centralized levels 14 
Outsourced to decentralized levels 0 
Don’t know / does not wish to answer 1 
Total 62 
 
Panel B 
Who caries out impairment tests at the group level? 
No. # 
One internal expert 12 
A team of internal experts  36 
External expert(s) 0 
Internal and  external experts 12 
Don’t know / does not wish to answer 0 
Total 60 
 
 
Panel C 
Which of the following terms best describes the external experts? 
No. # 
Audit firm 12 
Corporate Finance firm 0 
Consulting firm 0 
Don’t know / does not wish to answer 0 
Other (please specify in the textbox below) 0 
Total 12 
 
Panel D 
On a scale from 1 to 5, in to what extent are people who carry out 
impairment tests involved in other valuation jobs (1 means "Not at all", 
while 5 equals "To a very large extent")? 
No. # 
Don’t know / does not wish to answer 3 
1 1 
2 5 
3 13 
4 19 
5 20 
Total 61 
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V. Cash generating units 
 
Defining a CGU 
A CGU (cash generating unit) is the smallest group of identifiable assets that generates cash flows 
independent of cash flows from other assets or group of assets (IAS 36, 6). Ernst & Young (2006) 
notes that determining CGUs is not easy in practice. Also, IAS 36, 68 concedes that determining a 
CGU involves judgments. IAS 36, 80b states that a unit or group of units shall not be larger than an 
operating segment determined in accordance with IFRS 8 (operating segments). Despite of this IAS 
36 provides limited guidance in how to settle on a CGU. Deciding what constitutes a CGU, 
however, has an impact on the need to recognise impairment losses. Evidently the need to write-off 
depends upon the number of CGUs. Based on empirical research of the largest firms in Europe, 
Ernst & Young (2006, 35) conclude that in practice a firm recognises one CGU for each of its 
segments, even though firms do not specifically disclose it. 
 
Table 3 
Which of the following statements describes the relation between the 
number of CGUs and the number of segments (in accordance with IFRS 
8)? 
No. # 
No of CGUs = no. of segments 15 
No of CGUs < no. of segments 5 
No of CGUs > no. of segments 36 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 6 
Total 62 
 
The results in Table 3 illustrate, however, that only approximately 25% of the firms (in our sample) 
use a segment to represent a CGU. The main number of firms (36) has more CGUs than segments 
as defined in IFRS 8. Five firms operate with fewer CGUs than segments, which is a violation of 
IAS 36, 80b. The number of CGUs varies considerably across firms (not reported). There is on 
average (median) 16 (5) CGUs per firm. A few firms have one CGU per firm only, while one firm 
operates with 200 CGUs. On average (median) the turnover is DKK 838 (399) million per CGU, 
while there is a spread from DKK 12 million to DKK 10 billion.  
 
The statistics expose a great variety in the way CGUs are determined, which may impact the need 
for recognising impairment. From a user perspective this is not appropriate, as it complicates 
comparison of accounting data and financial ratios across firms.  
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Table 4 
Grade on a scale from 1 to 5 the extent to which each of the 
following statements describe the deciding factor for 
determining the number of CGUs (1 means 
" Not at all", while 5 means "To a very high degree") 
Don’t 
know/ do 
not wish to 
answer  
1 2 3 4 5 Total No. # 
The internal reporting systems determines how small a CGU 
may be 
3% 29% 18% 18% 15% 18% 100% 62 
A large number of CGUs will bring about a considerable 
number of impairment tests and thereby make impairment 
tests less operational 
8% 19% 10% 26% 24% 13% 100% 62 
CGUs must be in accordance with segments (in accordance 
with to IFRS 8) 
16% 23% 23% 13% 15% 11% 100% 62 
The number of write-offs should be hold at a minimum 6% 24% 31% 21% 11% 6% 100% 62 
Cash flows from the CGUs must be independent of each other 5% 6% 5% 26% 35% 23% 100% 62 
Other (please specify in the textbox below if relevant) 92% 2% 0% 2% 2% 3% 100% 62 
 
Table 4 illustrates what determines the number of CGUs. At least two statements seem to be a 
deciding factor. The statement that ’a large number of CGUs will bring about a considerable 
number of impairment tests and thereby make impairment tests less operational’ indicates that firms 
are pragmatic. The other statement that ‘Cash flows from the CGUs must be independent of each 
other’ is in line with IAS 36, 68. For some firms the internal reporting systems resolve how small a 
CGU might be. A few firms argue that the number of CGUs must be in accordance with segments 
(IFRS 8) or be decided based on the wish to reduce the number of write-offs. Especially the later 
argument is inappropriate, as firms speculate how to reduce the need for write-offs rather than 
establishing CGUs based on the standard’s indicators (e.g., that cash flows in CGUs must be 
independent of each other). 
 
Allocation of goodwill 
To carry out impairment tests on the CGU-level, in accordance with IAS 36, 80, purchased 
goodwill must be allocated to the respective CGUs that are assumed to benefit from synergies from 
the acquisitions.11
 
 
 
                                                 
11 IAS 36, IN11 state that ”each unit and group of units to which goodwill is allocated should not be larger than a 
segment based on either the entity’s primary or the entity’s secondary reporting format determined in accordance with 
IAS 14 Segment Reporting”. Due to special circumstances we have not been able to examine unambiguous, if firms act 
in accordance with this condition. 
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Table 5 
Panel A 
Do you allocate goodwill to a lower level than the group level? 
No. # 
Yes 33 
No 20 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 9 
Total 62 
 
Panel B 
Are impairment tests carried out at the group level so that the book value 
of all the groups’ assets is compared with the recoverable amount for the 
entire group? 
No. # 
Yes 8 
No 12 
Total 20 
 
 
Panel C 
Please specify the key to allocation of goodwill to CGUs (more than one 
answer is permitted): 
No. # 
The likely increase in value creation that the acquisition is expected to 
provide  
6 
Turnover, assets, equity (or other accounting items) in the CGUs, which 
goodwill is allocated to 
5 
Allocation of the acquired firms turnover, assets, equity  (or other 
accounting items) to CGUs 
12 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 7 
Other (please specify in the textbox below) 7 
Total 37 
 
Table 5 panel A shows to which level, goodwill is allocated. 33 of the participating firms allocate 
goodwill to a lower level than the group level. 20 firms do not allocate goodwill to a lower level 
than the group level. In their verbal comments firms, which do not allocate goodwill to a lower 
level than the group level, argue that they wish to make impairment tests operational. 
 
If firms do not allocate goodwill, IAS 36 requires that an impairment test on the group level must be 
carried out. Table 5 panel B reveals, however, that only eight out of 20 firms carry out impairment 
tests on the group level. The result that 12 firms apparently do not carry out impairment test - even 
at the group level - is puzzling. A possible explanation might be that goodwill is immaterial. 
However, our data does not support that this is the case. The level of goodwill deflated by total 
assets for the 12 firms corresponds to the level of goodwill for the remaining sample. An alternative 
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explanation might be that the respondents do not distinguish between a full-dress impairment test 
and the more ‘casual’ one as described in IAS 36, 99.12
 
Theoretically, goodwill should be allocated to a CGU or group of CGUs, which are expected to 
receive the economic benefits from the acquired activity. This is also required by IAS 36, IN11 
which states that ‘goodwill should….be allocated to each of the acquirer’s CGU, or groups of 
CGUs, that are expected to benefit from the synergies of the business combinations, irrespective of 
whether other assets or liabilities of the acquiree are assigned to those units or groups of units’. 
 
Table 6 panel C presents the allocation keys that are used to allocate goodwill in practice.  Six firms 
determine the allocation of goodwill based on the estimated value creation each CGU is expected to 
generate, which is in accordance with IAS 36. Most often, the size of the acquired firms turnover 
and assets that are recognised in each CGU or group of CGUs, are used as the criteria for allocation 
of goodwill. If allocation of goodwill is based on turnover or assets, the CGU, which ‘receives’ 
turnover and assets, must also receive the benefits from the pooling of the firms. As illustrated in 
IAS 36, IN11 above, this is not necessarily always the case. Seven firms answer ’other’ and the 
verbal comments indicate that allocation of goodwill is not a problem, as goodwill is recognised in 
the CGU that is affected by the acquisition (and, thus, need not to be allocated). 
 
Allocation of corporate assets 
Corporate assets (for example a head quarter, a common research center and common support 
facilities) may be problematic in relation to impairment tests of goodwill. IAS 36, 102 states that 
corporate assets must be allocated to individual CGUs. In the event that this is not possible, 
impairment tests should be carried out at a higher level (group of CGUs), to which it is possible to 
allocate corporate assets. As it might be difficult to allocate corporate assets to a CGU or group of 
CGUs in ‘a reasonable and consistent way’ (IAS 36, 102), it is likely that many firms choose not to 
do so. 
 
 
  
                                                 
12 If this is the explanation for our finding, one may question if those 12 firms are the ones that generally provide 
inconsistent answers to our survey. However, a closer review of the feedback from the respondents reveals that it is not 
the same firms that provide inconsistent answers throughout the questionnaire.   
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Table 6  
Panel A 
Are corporate assets and expenses allocated to a lower level than the 
group level? 
No. # 
Yes 17 
No 33 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 12 
Total 62 
 
 
Panel B 
Are impairment tests carried out on the group level, at which the 
carrying value of all the groups assets are compared to the recoverable 
amount for the entire group? 
No. # 
Yes 13 
No 20 
Total 33 
 
Table 6 panel A confirms this prediction. 33 firms do not allocate corporate assets to a lower level 
than group level, while only 17 firms do so. The 33 firms that do not allocate corporate assets to a 
lower level than group level, should carry out impairment tests on the group level cf. IAS 36, 102iii. 
The results (Table 6 panel B), however, prove that only 13 of the 33 firms carry out impairment 
tests on the group level. As a consequence firms may not recognise impairment losses to the extent 
that they should. 
 
 
VI. Method to estimating the recoverable amount 
 
Choice of valuation approach 
A central element in impairment tests is estimating the recoverable amount. The assets’ carrying 
value is compared with the recoverable amount and an impairment loss is recognised, if the 
recoverable amount is lower. In accordance with IAS 36, 18 the recoverable amount is the higher of 
its fair value less costs to sell and its value in use.  
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Table 7 
Panel A 
Which methods are used to estimate the recoverable amount for a CGU 
or group of CGUs? 
No. # 
Fair value less costs to sell 5 
Value in use 41 
Both methods 16 
Total 62 
 
Panel B 
When fair value less costs to sell is estimated, which of the following 
situations will the calculations be based on (more than one answer 
permitted)? 
No. # 
An offer to acquire the CGU exist 9 
The CGU or the group of CGUs are listed on a stock exchange 6 
A comparable firm has recently been bought/sold (multiple) 7 
A comparable listed firm exist (multiple) 4 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 4 
Other (please specify in the textbox below) 0 
Total 30 
 
Panel C 
Which of the following methods are used to estimate value in use in 
relation to impairment tests (more than one answer permitted)? 
No. # 
DCF-model (Discounted Cash Flow-model) 56 
EVA-model (Economic Value Added-model) 2 
Multiples 9 
Other (please specify in the textbox below) 1 
Total 68 
Number of respondents 57 
 
Table 7 panel A exposes that it is primarily value in use that is applied in determining the 
recoverable amount. Only five firms use fair value less costs to sell. 16 firms use this method in 
combination with value in use. Other firms (41) apply the value in use method exclusively. A 
possible explanation for the limited use of fair value (less costs to sell) is that the method 
necessitates that the market value of the CGU is known. It requires, in reality, that the CGU is a 
listed firm or (reliable) indicators of the market value are available.  
 
Table 7 panel B shows which methods firms apply in order to estimate fair value. In nine cases fair 
value is based on an offer from a third party to buy the CGU. In six cases the CGU is listed on a 
stock exchange, while in 11 cases a comparable firm’s price formation is used to estimate fair value. 
Finally, Table 7 panel B provides evidence that in a number of cases more than one method is 
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applied (total responses is greater than the number of respondents) in order to determine fair value 
(less costs to sell) of a CGU. This seems appropriate considering the uncertainty involved in the 
estimation of the value of a CGU. 
 
Methods to calculate value in use 
In estimating the value in use IAS 36, 30 suggests the application of the discounted cash flow 
model (DCF). Out of the 57 firms that apply the value in use method to determine the recoverable 
amount, 56 firms apply the DCF model (Table 7 panel C). In addition, the EVA model (2) and 
multiples (9) are applied. These methods are often used as a ’sanity check’.13 The one firm applying 
another method (’other’), seems to use a variant of the DCF model. Of the nine firms that use 
multiples, P/E (3) and EV/EBIT (3)14 are the most popular (not reported). As the P/E multiple 
estimates market value of a CGU’s equity, it is only meaningful to use this multiple on financial 
firms. However, only one of the three firms that use P/E multiples is a financial firm (i.e., a bank). 
As value in use for the other two firms CGUs must be the estimated enterprise value (value of 
business independent of how it has been financed), it is unsuitable to use the P/E-multiple. If the 
market value of the (net) interest bearing debt is known for the individual CGU, it can be added to 
the value estimate based on P/E to obtain the enterprise value. If the market value of interest bearing 
debt is unknown it will be difficult to estimate the enterprise value correctly.  
 
When multiples are applied it is paramount to make sure that the comparable firms have identical  
1) accounting practices, 2) expected future earnings growth, and 3) risks (See e.g. Damodaran 
2002). Based on the responses, firms are aware of the requirements to future earnings and risks. On 
the other hand, only two firms actively examine differences in applied accounting practices. To the 
extent that accounting practices differ between the comparable firms, the estimated value will be 
biased (or at least if P/E ratios are used as sanity checks, it might not be a meaningful way to check 
the validity of the estimated values). 
 
An important element in applying the DCF model is to be confident that budget assumptions are 
based on sound economic reasoning. As an indicator of the thoroughness of the impairment tests, 
the firms were asked how much time they spent per impairment tests of goodwill. On average 
                                                 
13 The feedback we received by calling respondents confirmed this fact. 
14 Where P, E, EV and EBIT are abbreviations for the market value of equity, net earnings, enterprise (value on a debt 
free basis) and earnings before interests and taxes.  
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(median) 20 (8) hours were used per impairment tests (not reported). However, the spread is 
significant as two firms carry out impairment tests in about an hour, while one firm use 200 hours 
per impairment test. There is a positive correlation between the number of hours spent per 
impairment tests and the size of the CGU. The correlation coefficient is 65% (not reported). This 
indicates that more time is spent on larger (and presumably more complicated) CGUs, which is as 
expected. It is difficult based on the feedback to tell if sufficient time has been spent on budget 
assumptions. For instance, it might be enough to spend one hour if a budget for the CGU is already 
available (e.g., a budget prepared during the yearly strategic planning). 
 
Petersen and Plenborg (2006) demonstrate that it is appropriate to use the same valuation model for 
every employee within the same group. It reduces the number of technical errors, makes 
maintenance easier, lower the reliance on specific persons and increases knowledge sharing and 
productivity among the firms’ employees. 
 
Table 8 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Does the group have a common 
discounted cash flow model that is 
available in a spreadsheet or the like? 
Panel B 
Is the common discounted cash 
flow model reviewed by the firm’s 
auditor? 
Panel C 
Is the same discounted cash flow 
model used for impairment tests and 
investment decisions? 
Yes 42 39 19 
No 11 3 17 
Don’t know / do not wish to 
answer 
2 0 6 
Total 55 42 42 
 
Table 8 panel A reveals that a general discounted cash flow model is used by 42 of the participating 
firms. Eleven firms do not use the same discounted cash flow model. This indicates that these firms 
do not have a systematic way of developing a DCF model for impairment test. This may be 
problematic, as it increases the possibility that these firms commit technical errors. Of the 42 firms 
that apply the same discounted cash flow model, 39 had the model reviewed by its auditor (panel 
B). This, naturally, improves the probability that the impairment tests are error free. 
 
The participating firms were asked if they use the same discounted cash flow model for impairment 
tests and investment decisions. Theoretically, there should be no differences between the two 
models, but as table 8 panel C reveals only 19 firms use the same discounted cash flow model for 
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the two purposes. The respondents, who did not use the same model, gave different explanations. 
For example, several mentioned that ”an investment decision is far more detailed and necessitates 
more assumptions and sensitivity checks”. Others pointed out that ”models used for impairment 
testing are carried out in accordance with IAS 36, which in some respects do not provide a business 
economics perspective and which, consequently, can be misleading”. Unfortunately, the feedback 
was silent as to what constitutes those business economics differences. One respondent stated that 
’different assumptions’ are used for investment decisions and impairment tests. The motivation for 
applying different assumptions, however, was not provided. 
 
Before-tax or after-tax discount rates and cash flows 
IAS 36, 50, 51 and 55 specify that before-tax cash flows must be discounted with a before-tax 
discount factor. However, IAS 36, BC94 acknowledges that, conceptually, discounting post-tax 
cash flows at a post-tax discount rate or discounting pre-tax cash flows at a pre-tax discount rate 
should give the same results. Even though the estimated value should be insensitive to the choice of 
a before tax respectively an after tax calculation, most academic books (e.g., Koller et al, 2005) 
estimate value in use on the basis of after-tax cash flows, discounted by an after-tax discount rate. 
An after tax calculation takes into consideration that firms pay tax on earnings from operations. In 
return firms benefit tax savings due to interest expenses on its debt. 
 
IAS 36 is not explicit in its guidance as how to calculate (estimate) a before-tax discount factor. 
Nonetheless, in reality the standard implicitly requires an iterative approach. Clarification 
concerning a before-tax discount factor can be found in IAS 36, BC8515. After the conclusions in 
BC85, an example illustrates that a before-tax discount rate can be calculated by an iterative 
process, so that discounting either before-tax cash flows with a before-tax discount rate or after-tax 
cash flows with an after-tax discount factor yield identical results. This ensures that the estimated 
value is the same independent of whether a before-tax or an after-tax approach is used. In other 
words it requires that value in use is estimated by applying an after-tax approach, followed by 
iteration process to find a before-tax discount factor that yields the exactly same value as the after-
tax approach. 
 
                                                 
15 BC is basis for conclusions (labeled NCZ in the standard). 
 19
An iterative process can only be avoided under the strict assumption that future cash flows are 
infinite and constant. In this special case the before-tax discount rate is calculated as the after-tax 
discount rate divided by the reciprocal value of the corporate tax rate (1 – corporate tax rate). Thus, 
it is not possible to calculate a discount factor that can be applied to different projects, as the 
iterated discount factor depend upon the distribution of the individual projects cash flows (see 
below and appendix A for further comments on this subject). 
 
 Table 9 
Which of the following two methods do you apply for discounting cash flows? 
Number 
Discounting of before-tax cash flows with before-tax discount factor 26 
Discounting of after-tax cash flows with an after-tax discount factor 23 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 5 
Total 54 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 shows that approximately half of the respondents (26) choose to estimate value in use based 
on before-tax cash flows discounted by before-tax discount rates. The other respondents measure 
value in use based on an after-tax calculation. As mentioned above a before-tax valuation of a 
project with finite expected cash flows only provides correct value in use estimates, if a value in use 
calculations is applied, where the before-tax discount rate is found by the iteration procedure (where 
the estimated value equals the value that is estimated using the after-tax approach). The same 
applies for projects with infinite expected cash flows that are assumed to grow. In table 10 the 
respondents were asked how to transform an after-tax discount rate to a before-tax discount rate. 
 
 
Table 10 
How is the after-tax discount rate transformed to a 
before-tax discount rate? 
Panel A 
How is the before-tax discount rate estimated 
for projects with a definite lifetime? 
Panel B 
How is the before-tax discount rate 
estimated for projects with an indefinite 
lifetime? 
After-tax required return / (1- corporate tax rate) 4 2 
Other adjustment of after-tax required rate of return 1 1 
By iteration 0 0 
Investors required rate of return * equity/(equity + 
interest borrowing debt) + interest rate * interest 
borrowing debt/ (equity + interest borrowing debt) 
8 11 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 10 9 
Other (please specify in the text box below) 3 3 
Total 26 26 
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Table 10 panels A and B expose that none of the respondents use the iteration method to 
determining the before-tax discount rate. Panel A displays that four respondents divide the after-tax 
discount rate with the reciprocal value of the corporate tax rate. As a result the valuation is biased, 
as evidenced in appendix A. The example (in appendix A) further highlights that the shorter the 
expected lifetime of the project, the more biased the value estimate. Based on the example the 
percentage difference from the theoretical correct value estimate increases from approximately 9% 
to almost 29%, if the lifetime of the project is changed from for example 20 years to 5 years. This 
type of errors, thus, has a significant impact on the value estimate. Table 10 panel B uncovers that 
two respondents divide the after-tax discount rate with the reciprocal value of the corporate tax rate. 
This is only correct under the assumption that cash flows from a CGU are indefinitely and constant. 
The questionnaire does not reveal, however, if the cash flows that are discounted are constant 
making it impossible to determine if two respondents make unbiased estimates of the discount rate 
and, hereby, the value estimate. 
  
Eight (11) respondents use a discount factor that disregard tax benefits associated with interest 
bearing debt in their WACC-calculation used for valuing projects with a finite (infinite) lifetime. 
This is, however, not the correct way to calculate the before-tax discount rate. This can best be 
exemplified by looking at firms that are 100% equity financed. For those firms equity holders’ 
required rate of return is equal to the firm’s WACC. Furthermore, the before and after-tax discount 
rates (WACC) are identical, as the firms do not have any tax savings from loan capital. In this 
scenario, expected earnings before tax and after tax will be discounted by the same (required) rate 
of return, which is incorrect. As a consequence the estimated value based on before-tax cash flows 
are biased upwards as the before-tax discount rate is too low. 
 
The three respondents, who ticked ’other’, reply that they either use a before-tax discount rate 
estimated by an ”external investment bank” or that their firm does not have ”a fixed practice for 
estimating the before-tax discount factor”. While the latter response is basically uninformative, it 
indicates that the firm may not be fully aware of the issues in calculating the before-tax discount 
rate. Unfortunately, they do not explain how they estimate a before-tax discount factor.  
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Risk 
In accordance with IAS 36, 55 and 56 and appendix A15 risk specific to the asset must be 
accounted for by either adjusting the cash flow or the discount rate. This is in line with 
recommendations in prevalent corporate finance literature (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 2003), who 
name the two methods ’the certainty equivalent method’ and ’the risk-adjusted discount rate 
method’, respectively. Theoretically, the two methods yield identical results and choosing between 
the two shouldn’t matter. Previous studies have shown that practitioners almost exclusively use the 
risk-adjusted discount rate method (Petersen et al., 2006). It is also the method that is best described 
in the popular valuation literature (e.g., Koller et. al 2005 and Damodaran 2002). In addition beta 
values, which are used to estimate the risk adjusted discount rate, are reported in financial databases 
like Bloomberg. Beta (β) is measured as 
 
β =Cov[rass, rm]/Var(rm), 
 
where Cov, rass, rm and Var represent covariance, return on assets, marked return and variance 
respectively. The certainty equivalent method estimates the cash flow that makes an investor 
indifferent between a certain cash flow and an uncertain cash flow in a given point of time. The 
certainty equivalent method requires that the cash flows are adjusted for risk. This adjustment can 
be shown as CE(CF) = (Expected cash flow – b[um-rf]). um is the expected rate of return on the 
market portfolio and b is measured as  
 
b= Cov[CFt, rm]/Var(rm). 
 
In the following we examine how firms adjust for risk. 
 
Table 11 
Where do you adjust for the risk, when you apply the DCF-model? 
No. # 
The cash flows (nominator) 8 
Discount rate (denominator) 31 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 16 
Total 55 
 
Eight respondents adjust for risk in the cash flows and 31 respondents adjust for the risk in the 
discount rate (Table 11). IAS 36, 55-56 speaks of ‘adjustments to the cash flows’ without 
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specifying how these adjustments should be made. Since the standard is silent as how to risk adjust 
for cash flows, we want to examine current practice. The results are reported in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 
How do you adjust cash flows for risk, when you apply the DCF-model? 
Number 
By making a conservative estimate of the free cash flows 4 
By weighting the likelihood of possible future cash flows 1 
They expected free cash flows are reduced by multiplying them with a 
factor calculated  via the risk adjusted required rate of return (the factor 
can for explicit budget years be estimated as follows:((1+rf)/(1+r))^n) 
0 
They expected free cash flows reduced with a fixed percentage 1 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 2 
Other (please specify in the textbox below) 0 
Total 8 
 
Four respondents adjust for risk by measuring cash flows conservatively. While this procedure 
adjusts for risk, it will only by chance be unbiased. Furthermore, in practice it is unclear what 
‘measuring conservatively’ means. What some might perceive as conservative, others might 
perceive as the most likely outcome. One respondent adjusts for the risk by probability weighting 
future cash flows. This corresponds to what IAS 36, appendix A defines as expected cash flow. This 
method simply weights the different likely outcomes (cash flows) and adds them. The method is 
proposed as an alternative to estimation of the expected cash flows rather than the most likely cash 
flow. A probability weighting of the different cash flows, therefore, is not the correct way to adjust 
for risk. One respondent reduces the expected cash flows with a fixed percentage. There is no way 
to tell how this percentage has been calculated, but if the same fixed percentage is used across 
business units that carry different risks, the adjustment for the risk is not correct. Two respondents 
do not inform how they adjust for risk in the cash flows. 
 
IAS 36, 56 requires that the discount rate reflects the risk of the assets; i.e. the risk of each CGU. If 
the discount rate is adjusted for risk, cash flows should be discounted with the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) or a variant hereof (e.g., implicit discount factor for comparable firms) that 
reflects the risk of each CGU.16  
 
                                                 
16 As the value for financial institutions (e.g., banks) is estimated on the equity level, the required rate of return for those 
kinds of firms will be the equity holders required rate of return. 
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Table 13 
Your responses to the previous questions have shown that you in 
applying the DCF model discount after-tax cash flows with an after-tax 
discount rate. 
 
Which of the following after-tax discount rates do you apply? 
No. # 
Implicit discount factor for comparable firms 0 
WACC 15 
The risk free rate 2 
The average borrowing rate 1 
The marginal  borrowing rate 0  
Equity holders required rate of return 7 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 2 
Other (please specify in the textbox below) 2 
Total 29 
 
As reported in table 13 approximately half (15) of those who adjust for risk in the denominator use 
WACC, which is correct if the WACC reflects the risk to the specific CGU. Of the 15 respondents 
who use WACC, 12 use different WACC’s across CGUs (not reported). They argue that this is due 
to the fact that business activities carry different risks, for example, due to CGUs that are situated in 
different parts of the world (country risk) and differences in the financial leverage in the individual 
CGUs. Two respondents, who argue that risk is adjusted in the discount factor, use the risk free 
interest rate. Clearly, the risk free rate does not take risk into account. One respondent uses the 
average borrowing rate. This discount factor, however, does not include equity holders required rate 
of return and is biased. Seven respondents use the equity holders required rate of return, three of 
these are financial institutions. The remaining four uses interest bearing debt as well as equity in 
their capital structure and should use WACC or a variant hereof as the discount rate. The two 
respondents, who respond ’other’, use a ’combination of WACC and average rate of return on 
excess cash’ and an ’estimated discount factor’. It is difficult to evaluate an ’estimated discount 
factor’, while a ’combination of WACC and average rate of return on excess cash’ is incorrect. Of 
the 27, who respond, which discount factor they use, at least eight use a discount factor not 
supported by theory. Considering how well this area is portrayed in the finance literature, the results 
came as a surprise (to us). 
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 The length of the budget period and determining terminal value 
IAS 36, 33 states that ”projections based on these budgets/forecasts shall cover a maximum period 
of five years, unless a longer period can be justified”. The intention is to limit the number of explicit 
budget years, prior to the terminal period.  
 
Table 14 
Do you use the same number of budget years in all CGUs, when you 
apply discounted cash flow calculations for impairment testing 
purposes? 
Number 
Yes 41 
No 9 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 5 
Total 55 
 
According to Table 14, 41 respondents use the same budget period for all CGUs, while nine 
respondents use different budget periods across CGUs. Out of the 41 respondents, who use the same 
budget period across CGUs, 19 use a budget period of 5 years (not reported), while five respondents 
use a 10 year budget period. The other respondents use a budget period ranging from 1 to 4 years. 
As decisive factors for choosing the length of the budget period, the respondents pointed to the 
ability to create abnormal profit and the life cycle of the CGUs. Furthermore, some of the 
respondents mentioned that the number of years in the budget period was based on what seems 
reasonable and was inspired by the firm’s general budget routines. Thus, the choice of the explicit 
budget period seems to be well founded and in accordance with IAS 36. 
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How many years into the terminal period do 
you budget explicitly? 
Table 15 
Terminal calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 
2 or 
more 
Don’t 
know / 
do not 
wish to 
answer 
 
Total
Free cash flows in terminal period grow with a constant growth rate every year = 
FCF/(WACC-g), (Gordon’s growth model) 
11 7 9 1 28 
Growth in the terminal period does not create value / free cash flows in the terminal 
period does not grow = NOPAT/WACC, (convergence model) 
4 1 1  6 
Return on invested capital is different from cost of capital in the terminal period = 
(NOPAT*(1-g/ROIC ))/(WACC-g), (Value driver formula) 
 1 2  3 
We use multiples 1  1  2 
Other (please specify below) 1    1 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 2 3 4 3 12 
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Total 19 12 17 4 52 
 
IAS 36 does not provide any guidance as to which method(s) to use in estimating the terminal 
value. Table 15 shows that 28 respondents apply Gordon’s growth model, while three respondents 
use the value driver formula (i.e. 31 respondents assume growth in the terminal period). Six 
respondents assume that growth do not create value in the terminal period and, thus, use the 
convergence model. These results match the ones reported in Petersen et al. (2006). They find that 
professional investors and financial advisers generally assume growth in estimating terminal value. 
Two respondents use multiples to estimate terminal value. While this is not ruled out in IAS 36, it is 
a violation of the DCF model. As presumable 70% or more of the estimated value can be attributed 
to the terminal value, most of the value estimate is captured by the multiple. It is therefore an open 
question if the respondents who use multiples in essence apply a DCF model. 
 
A prerequisite for a proper application of estimating terminal value is that the estimated expected 
start-of-terminal-period cash flow is indicative of the future cash flow generation. Therefore a firm 
must have reached the so called ”steady state”, where all parameters that decide future cash flows 
(turnover, expenses, invested capital etc.) have reached the same level of growth. The only way to 
assure this is to budget the free cash flow, based on the income statement and balance sheet, (at 
least) one year into the terminal period (Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001). The logic behind this can 
be illustrated by the following simplified example. Assume a firm has a free cash flow of 100 in the 
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final year of the explicit forecast period. Growth in that year was an estimated 6%. In the terminal 
period growth is assumed to be 2%. It might be tempting to calculate the free cash flow for the first 
year in the terminal period as 100*1.02 = 102. As growth is decreasing less cash is tied in working 
capital and fixed assets, and the level of free cash is shifted upward, so that it is in excess of 102.17 
It is not unusual that the free cash flow is 30-40% higher than the 102. If growth is assumed in 
calculating terminal values, the consequences for the value estimate will be significant, if a firm do 
not make an explicit budget for the first year of the terminal period in estimating the free cash 
flow.18 This is also pointed out by Levin and Olsson (2000) who argue: “…even minor internal 
inconsistencies can have a substantial impact on the final value estimate of a company.” 
 
If the convergence model is applied, it is assumed that depreciations (and amortisations) match 
reinvestments, which is why net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) is used as an estimate for the 
free cash flow. In such cases it is typically not necessary to budget into the terminal period. NOPAT 
for the last explicit budget year is representative for future earnings (cash flows). Only in the special 
case, where depreciations are a poor estimate for reinvestments, is it necessary to budget explicitly 
into the terminal period or make adjustments to depreciations. It is typically the case, if significant 
investments have been made prior to the last budget year. In summary, firms should budget 1-2 
years into the terminal period, if they use Gordon’s growth model.  
 
In Table 15 the choice of terminal value model is paired with number of years budgeted into the 
terminal period. This pairing is made to highlight, whether respondents, who apply Gordon’s 
growth model, make explicit forecast into the terminal period. As seen in the table, 11 out of 28 
respondents do not explicitly forecast into the terminal period. The consequence is that the free cash 
flow that terminal value estimation is based on is most likely biased. It may at the same time have 
significant effect on the value estimate. It is difficult to give an unequivocal answer on the other 
crossing, but generally the judgment is that the free cash flow/NOPAT that are used as a basis for 
the respective terminal value models, are estimated correctly. 
 
                                                 
17 It might be discussed if the same profit margin can be sustained if the growth rate is lower. However, this is irrelevant 
for the example. 
18 If lagged budget assumptions are used (e.g., depreciations based on the beginning of the period fixed assets), it might 
be necessary to budget two years into the terminal period in order to determine the free cash flow (Petersen and 
Plenborg (2006)). 
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Valuation of firms is not an exact science. Value estimates are affected by a large number of 
judgments and a budget that often assumes infinite lifetime for the CGU. That is why it is 
appropriate to carry out sensitivity analyses that measure the effect on value estimates of changes in 
major assumptions. 
 
Table 16 
Do you carry out any kind of sensitivity analysis in estimating value in 
use? 
No. # 
Yes 32 
No 14 
Don’t know / do not wish to answer 8 
Total 54 
 
Table 16 uncovers how many respondents who make sensitivity analyses. 32 apply sensitivity 
analyses, while 14 do not. Based on the feedback it is unclear, if the lack of sensitivity analyses 
reflects that there is no need to verify the valuation or if it is simply not a routine in relation to 
impairment tests. They respondents, who choose to carry out a sensitivity analyses, recognise 
impairment losses (in the income statement), if a certain percentage (typically over 50%) of the 
simulated scenarios indicate a need to write-off (not reported). 
 
VII. Conclusions and perspectives 
 
We examine how firms define a CGU and how those firms measure the recoverable amount of a 
CGU adopting a survey approach. A risk inherent in surveys is that the respondents are not 
representative of the population and that the questions may be misunderstood. We put considerable 
effort into reducing those risks. As a result we obtained a high response rate (more than 70%) and 
received feedbacks from respondents, who are deeply involved in carrying out impairment tests. 
Our survey generally supports that a common practice has not yet been established. Based on our 
analysis is difficult to say whether this simply reflects that firms adopt an approach suited to their 
organisational and economic structures or it suggests that firms are uncertain as how to apply the 
standard. We also find that some firms do not define a CGU in compliance with IAS 36. A few 
firms operate with fewer CGUs than segments, which is a violation of IAS 36, 80b. Some firms also 
argue that they choose the number of CGUs based on the wish to reduce the number of write-offs, 
which is a violation of IAS 36, 80. Twenty firms do not include corporate assets in a CGU for 
impairment testing purposes, which is a violation of IAS 36, 102.   
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Further, we find inconsistencies in the way that firms estimate the recoverable amount. None of the 
firms used the iteration method to transform an after-tax discount rate to a before-tax discount rate. 
Firms also experience difficulties in risk adjusting cash flows and discount rates. The estimation of 
the free cash flow in the terminal period is another area of concern. Finally, a few firms do not use 
multiples properly. 
 
Since IAS 36 was adopted in March 2004 the responses in our survey are obtained from 
respondents that (in many cases) have limited experience with impairment tests of goodwill. It may, 
therefore, be premature to draw any strong conclusions based on our results. However, we still 
believe that our results should be of interest. Firms may use our findings to improve the way that 
they carry out impairment tests. Auditors may use our results to focus on areas that deserve further 
attention. Standard setters may want to evaluate the current standard and consider how improve it. 
For example, a follow through example that clearly explains how the value of a CGU is estimated 
based on a before-tax/after-tax basis and how to adjust for risk in the cash flow and discount rate, 
respectively, would be useful. 
 
This study may benefit extended by considering the following issues. It is obvious to analyse, what 
characterises firms that have most difficulties in implementing complicated standards (e.g., 
IFRS/IAS3). Such research may be beneficial as help and resources can be directed towards firms 
that find it difficult to implement new standards. Research could also be extended to other 
accounting items with a similar complexity. Provisions, stock options and financial instruments are 
some of the accounting items, which deserve to be further researched. It also seems appropriate to 
examine how users of financial statements read, interpret and use accounting information, including 
challenging accounting items such as write-offs of goodwill. This is also supported by the fact that 
new and more complex accounting standards keep coming. A recent research project in Norway 
(Kinserdal, 2006) documented that financial analysts do not properly consider that pension 
liabilities in Norwegian firms are valued differently (based on different assumptions). Such results 
may question, whether or not financial analysts use all value relevant accounting information in 
valuation of firms. 
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Appendix A 
The following examples show the consequences of calculating the before-tax discount rate as the 
after-tax discount rate / (1 – the corporate tax rate) inconsistent with the recommended iteration 
method in IAS 36.  
 
In the first example infinite lifetime is assumed, while the second example assumes finite lifetime. 
 
I. Example 1: Infinite lifetime 
In the first example the required rate of return after tax (WACC) is assumed to be 10%, growth in 
both the explicit budget and terminal period is 3% and the corporate tax rate is 30%. Finally, it is 
assumed that the free cash flow (FCF) after tax is 10.00 in the first forecast year.  
 
s growth is the same in the forecast period and the terminal period, is it not necessary to operate 
 the 
result the value is 11.4% too low (126.58 against 142.86). 
Example, indefinite lifetime
WACC (discount rate after tax) 10,00%
Growth in budget period 3,00% Terminal
Growth i terminal period 3,00% period
Tax rate 30,00%
Free cash flow before tax 14,29 14,71 15,16 15,61 16,08
Tax  -4,29 -4,41 -4,55 -4,68 -4,82
Free cash flow after tax 10,00 10,30 10,61 10,93 11,26
After tax calculation
FCF 10,00 10,30 10,61 10,93 11,26
Discount factor 0,9091 0,8264 0,7513 0,6830
PV FCF 9,09 8,51 7,97 7,46
Present value of FCF 33,04
Present value of FCF - terminal period 109,82
Estimated value 142,86
Before tax calculation [WACC/(1-tax rate)]
Free cash flow before tax 14,29 14,71 15,16 15,61 16,08
Discount factor 14,29%
Discount factor, before tax 0,8750 0,7656 0,6699 0,5862
PV FCF 12,50 11,27 10,15 9,15
Present value of FCF 43,07
Present value of FCF - terminal period 83,51
Estimated value 126,58
Iteration
Free cash flow before tax 14,29 14,71 15,16 15,61 16,08
Discount factor (unknown) 13,00%
Discount factor, before tax 0,8850 0,7831 0,6931 0,6133
PV FCF 12,64 11,52 10,50 9,57
Present value of FCF 44,24
Present value of FCF - terminal period 98,61
Estimated value 142,86
 
A
with two forecast periods. This assumption is kept, however, as in practice most operate with a 
budget period as well as a terminal period. In the example the budget period is four years. Under
specified budget assumptions, the discount rate is 9.8% is too high (14.29% against 13.00%). As a 
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In the next table the same budget assumptions are applied except of the growth rate. This is 
ssumed to vary from 0% to 6% in all future periods (contrary to 3% in the example above). 
fter-tax discount factor / (1- the corporate tax rate) 
ill only prove correct, assuming no growth in all future periods (growth = 0%). Under other 
hereby the estimated net present value 
ecoverable amount) is biased. The higher the assumed future growth, the more biased the 
te lifetime is assumed for a project (5 years respectively 20 years) that 
 valued. FCF in the first budget year is 100 and the after-tax discount rate is 10%. Further, growth 
varies form –5% to 5% p.a. Under these assumptions it is evident that 
ssuming zero growth in the FCF and a five-year project lifetime the before-tax discount rate is 
a consequence the project is overvalued by 
8.5% (487 against 379). The example further illustrates the effect of the error if the projects 
g 
Wrong discount rate before tax 14,28% 14,28% 14,28% 14,28% 14,28% 14,28%
Correct discount rate before tax 14,28% 13,86% 13,42% 13,00% 12,57% 12,14%
Discount rate, percentage change 0,0% 3,0% 6,4% 9,8% 13,6% 17,6%
Value correct discount rate 100,00 111,11 125,00 142,86 166,67 200,00
Value wrong discount rate 100 107,53 116,28 126,58 138,89 153,85
Value, percentage change 0,0% -3,2% -7,0% -11,4% -16,7% -23,1%
a
 
Growth 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
 
As seen from the table, a before-tax discount rate calculated as 
 
A
 
w
growth assumptions, the discount rate before-tax and 
(r
estimated net present value. 
 
Example 2: Finite lifetime 
In the following example fini
is
in the lifetime of the project 
the shorter the lifetime of the project, the higher the impact from the before-tax discount rate 
estimated as  
 
After-tax discount factor / (1- the corporate tax rate) 
 
A
undervalued by 44.3% (14.29% against 25.66%). As 
2
lifetime increases from five years to 20 years. It demonstrates that the shorter the lifetime of the 
project, the greater the effect of the miscalculated before-tax discount factor on value in use. 
Growth has an effect on, as evident from the example, the bias introduced by applying a wron
before-tax discount factor. This is hardly surprising cf. the example with infinite lifetime 
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Example, finite lifetime
Free cash flow aftyer tax, 1. budget year 100
Discount rate after tax 10%
Example, finite lifetime
Lifetime of the project, years 5 20 5 20 5 20
Growth in FCF p.a. 0% 0% 5% 5% -5% -5%
Wrong discount rate before tax 14,29% 14,29% 14,29% 14,29% 14,29% 14,29%
Correct discount rate before tax 25,66% 15,90% 25,06% 14,82% 26,32% 17,30%
Discount rate, change in percent -44,3% -10,1% -43,0% -3,6% -45,7% -17,4%
Value, correct discount rate 379,08 851,36 415,06 1211,2 346,36 631,14
Value, wrong discount rate 487,09 930,79 531,36 1256 446,76 722,36
Value, change in percent 28,5% 9,3% 28,0% 3,7% 29,0% 14,5%
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